25 Nov 15:00 Yulia Chuiko: Selfish routing with splittable traffic and incomplete information

Dr. Yulia Chuiko from Russian Academy of Science will give a guest talk at Spektri 3rd floor on Wed 25.11 at 15:00.

Selfish routing with splittable traffic and incomplete information


We investigate the equilibria in Bayesian routing game in network with selfish users' behavior where each user chooses his route trying to minimize the expected delay of his own traffic he send. This scheme is based on [Gairing M., Monien B., Tiemann K. Selfish Routing with Incomplete information // Theory Comput Syst, 2008, pp. 91-130.] and modified for model with parallel links where user's traffic is splittable. Our interest are equilibria: Wardrop Equilibrium, that always exists and can be found using potential function, and its special case Bayesian Wardrop Equilibrium, that can be more easily understood by users, but its existence is an open question.

Key words: optimal routing, splittable traffic, incomplete information, Wardrop equilibrium.

Last updated on 4 Jan 2010 by WWW administrator - Page created on 25 Nov 2009 by Visa Noronen