Abstract

In this talk, I will discuss issues that arise when agents with diverse preferences and attributes need to form groups and elect representative bodies. In the context of elections, I will survey the work on the justified representation axiom and its variants, as well as the rules that satisfy it. In the context of group formation, I will talk about my recent work on hedonic games with diversity preferences, where agents have preferences over how diverse their groups are. This work is closely connected to Schelling’s study of racial segregation, and I will also mention the game-theoretic model we have recently developed for this setting.

Bio

Edith Elkind is a Professor at University of Oxford, where her work is supported by an ERC Starting Grant. She obtained her PhD from Princeton in 2005, and has held positions in UK, Israel and Singapore since then. Her interests are in algorithmic game theory and computational social choice, and she has published over 100 papers in top AI and algorithmic game theory venues on these topics. She has served as a program chair of AAMAS’15 and ACM EC’18 and a general chair of AAMAS’19, and she was recently elected to be the program chair of IJCAI’23. She serves on editorial boards of several journals, including Artificial Intelligence Journal, ACM Transaction on Economics and Computation and Social Choice and Welfare.